THE NATION

February 9, 1963 . . 25c



The Military Budget

TUG-OF-WAR

Jerry Greene

OPENINGS FOR DIPLOMACY

1. Cracks in the Blocs
   Fred Warner Neal
2. Cuba: Catalyst of Peace
   Leslie Dewart

ROBERT FROST: A Reminiscence

Roger Kahn

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LETTERS

Printers' side

New York City

Dear Sirs: The slap at the New York newspaper strike by Arthur Mulligan in *The Nation*, January 19, follows hard on one by Polly Kline of *The News* in the *Village Voice*, January 10. It is a peculiarity of the newspaper strike that it has given leisure to many articulate professionals, some of whom are in their idleness conjuring up against Local 6 the vile image, so often conjured up by their senior editors, against labor in general, namely the image of the Labor Czar—in this case Local 6 president Bertram Powers.

We read: "Powers called a strike. . . ." But the strike was voted by secret ballot of 2,003 members against forty-seven. We read: ". . . The power play pulled by Powers . . . ," as if there were no legitimate demands involved, merely arrant will. Anyone who knows anything about Local 6 knows that it is ruled by an almost fanatically democratic procedure—the union can hardly buy a box of envelopes without calling a general membership meeting, and a tip to a messenger boy is duly recorded and published in a monthly bulletin.

One must read to the end of Mr. Mulligan's article before one is told that there are, after all, some legitimate demands and grievances at issue in this strike and lockout (Mulligan deals lightly with the lockout aspects, as does *The Nation* editorial in the same issue). *Arthur M. Zipser*

Names confused

Chicago, Ill.

Dear Sirs: Through error or inadvertence, you have done a grave wrong to *World Book Encyclopedia* in the article "A Salesman Will Call" by Ralph Lee Smith in your January 5 issue.

This article indicted the direct-selling business in general and the selling of encyclopedias in particular. It referred to Federal Trade Commission action against the selling methods of three encyclopedia companies. To our complete amazement, you then isolated *World Book Encyclopedia* as a fourth member of this group.

We have never, and I repeat never, indulged in any of the practices Mr. Smith attributes to other reference publishers and we have never received a complaint from the Federal Trade Commission, nor have we had a hearing before the Federal Trade Commission, or ever been fined. We cooperate fully with the local Better Business Bureaus in all the areas we operate, and have spent years in training our sales organization in the ethical, proper and dignified selling of the *World Book Encyclopedia*, which is first in sales and first in school use in the United States.

As an admirer of *The Nation*, and a reader for many years, I was most distressed to find our organization a victim of "guilt by association." We do not publish and have no connection whatever with *World Wide Encyclopedia* or the *World Scope Encyclopedia*, whose selling methods Mr. Smith criticized.

You were correct in stating that our company's sales increased from $18 million in 1950 to $96 million in 1960. Sales were $103 million in 1962—a public confirmation, we believe, of our policy of having fine products sold through the honest and ethical methods we believe in and have always pursued.

John W. Dienhart
Public Relations Director
Field Enterprises Educational Corporation
Publishers: *World Book Encyclopedia* and *Childcraft*

New York City

Dear Sirs: I want to express my most sincere apologies to Mr. John W. Dienhart and the publishers of *World Book Encyclopedia* for the erroneous statement in my article that *World Book Encyclopedia* is the publisher of *World Wide Encyclopedia* and *World Scope Encyclopedia*. This mistake, which arose from the similarity of the names involved, occurred during the original collating of the materials for the article, and I did not catch it in the galleys.

I am happy to confirm that I have not at any time encountered any report of misleading sales practices by representatives of *World Book Encyclopedia*. *Ralph Lee Smith*

The crime

Detroit, Mich.

Dear Sirs: An attorney is not always emotionally affected by what happens to his client, but the case of Gus Polites has deeply moved me as a human being and as a citizen. Mr. Polites came to this country from Greece as a lad of seventeen. He has lived, worked and learned here for almost half a century. He married and raised children who, in turn, have raised their own children. He has worked hard, accumulated no wealth, committed no crime, never consciously hurt anyone; he is now ill in his old age and lives meagerly on a small pension which he receives because of his infirmity.

But Mr. Polites is to be deported because, in 1930, finding himself unemployed along with millions of others, he joined the Communist Party and remained a member until 1938. It was the wrong party; it had the wrong ideas—and Mr. Polites joined it thirty-odd years ago and left it almost a quarter-century ago. And for this he must be deported!

Ernest Goodman

THE NATION

Saturday, February 9, 1963
Volume 196, No. 6

In this issue

EDITORIALS

109

ARTICLES

111 Opening for Diplomacy:
1. Cracks in the Blocs
Fred Warner Neal
2. Cuba: Catalyst of Peace
Leslie Dewart
115 Farmers: the Real Surplus
Peter Dorner
117 Tug-of-War: The Military Budget
Jerry Greene

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

121 Robert Frost: A Reminiscence
Roger Kahn
122 Israel in Fiction
Ronald Sanders
123 A Hold on Life
H. Arthur Klein
124 The Visitant (poem)
George Cuomo
125 Theatre
Harold Clurman
127 Art
Hilton Kramer
127 asleep on the train (poem)
Gary Snyder
Crossword Puzzle (opp. 128)
Frank W. Lewis

George G. Kirstein, Publisher
Carey McWilliams, Editor
Victor H. Bernstein, Managing Editor
Robert Hatch, Books and the Arts
Marion Hess, Assistant to the Editors
Harold Clurman, Theatre
Hilton Kramer, Art
Benjamin Boretz, Music
Carl Dreher, Science
David Ignatow, Poetry
Jane Stolle, United Nations
Alexander Werth, Europe
Mary Simon, Advertising Manager

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One Man?

Every fiction has its day and, when reality overtakes it, a scapegoat must be found. General de Gaulle is the 1963 scapegoat. Single-handedly, the theory goes, he has come close to wrecking the Western alliance by locking Britain out of the Common Market. Here nonsense reaches its apogee and, blazing like a meteor, plunges to earth. The fact, plain to see for all but the willfully blind, is that de Gaulle has simply watched the course of events and, as a man of considerable political acumen and experience, has made sensible adjustments in French policy. And he has ample French support. For decades we have been told the French are realists. Well, they are, and de Gaulle is a Frenchman.

Obviously, it was not economics that led to the General's obduracy at Brussels; he simply did not want the Common Market swallowed by a grand alliance in which he had no faith.

The basic fiction on which the grand alliance was built was that the Russian hordes would overrun Europe the minute the West let down its guard. This notion suited the purposes of Mr. Truman and Winston Churchill after World War II; it was also expedient for many Europeans to subscribe to it, but few, whether in high places or low, really believed it. A corollary fiction was that the Soviet bloc, for the first time in the history of nations, constituted a monolithic alliance which only an equally firm coalition of the free nations of the Eastern and Western Hemispheres could cope with. This fiction has also been exposed for what it is. The Soviet bloc is a bloc no longer; its disarray is worse than the West's. De Gaulle, by all indications, never believed either fiction, or the numerous small rationalizations which followed in their train. His skepticism concerning the magic efficacy and necessity of NATO is not at all new. He has snubbed NATO repeatedly, refusing to allow U.S. nuclear weapons to be stationed on French soil, withdrawing French Army divisions and naval vessels from NATO command, and in every possible way showing he was not impressed. If American analysts at top levels had shown half the foresight with which they are credited, de Gaulle's latest move would not have come as a surprise.

Perhaps it did not, and the mortification and dismay are mainly journalistic hubbub. If President Kennedy did not read the signs and portents, he was remarkably obtuse. It is ironical that just as he was getting tough with his allies and assuming firm leadership of the West, he should be faced by such open rebellion, but it may be that he saw what was coming and tried to head it off by an anticipatory show of force. If so, the prophylaxis failed. With de Gaulle, it would.

It would be a mistake for U.S. policy makers to try to rally the West against de Gaulle. NATO, that precious accretion of the cold war, is far from disintegrated. De Gaulle himself has not completely abandoned it. Nor will de Gaulle, a Catholic conservative, make his own *modus vivendi* with Khrushchev, unless his allies try to isolate him. It would be wiser for President Kennedy to make the best of inevitable change. U Thant made a remark last summer which Mr. Kennedy will do well to ponder: ". . . No country," said the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "has permanent friends or permanent enemies, but only permanent interests." If Mr. Kennedy will remember that, the coming adjustments may not be too painful.

Stop Whistling Dixie

The Bay of Pigs invasion is beginning to resemble the Civil War. Why the losers lost, what mistakes were made, which generals were the worst — the questions can be argued until they become a separate branch of literature, with an expert on every Washington street corner to guide the uninitiated to the right conclusions. With this difference: the Civil War was fought a hundred years ago and was not devoid of idealism; the Cuban adventure is recent, it is in the thick of partisan politics, and the arguments about it are as dirty and disheveled as the invasion itself.

The current revival, by all appearances, is the President's own fault. His brother, the Attorney General, is said to be his closest adviser. Presumably, then, the President knew that Robert was about to say "unequivocally" that his brother, the President, never withdrew air cover because there had never been any plans to supply air cover and so there was nothing to withdraw. If the President did not know of Robert's plans, perhaps he should suggest that Robert stick to his job as Attorney General, which has proved to be quite enough for predecessors who were not lacking in acumen and energy.

The President is not a nervous sort of man, but he seems to be afflicted with a Bay of Pigs complex which compels him to keep stirring up the affair, as he did gratuitously at the Orange Bowl in Miami. For their part, the Republicans see a chance to revive the stab-in-the-back myth which was used so effectively by the German militarists and Fascists after World War I. We would have won if that fellow in the White House hadn't lost his nerve and withdrawn the air cover, is the gist of it. But the truth of the matter is that the invasion plan not only did not contemplate air cover (if we are to believe Robert Kennedy), but there never was anything properly describable as a plan. The operation was a military abortion from the beginning, and how it ever got the approval of the Chiefs of Staff is the real mystery. The civilian strategists who

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surround the President were no better and — though it is difficult to allot the honors — the Central Intelligence Agency has an unassailable claim, on the ground that its preparations made all the operational idiocies possible.

It is more profitable to concentrate on the present situation. Actions do speak louder than words, and the President's actions since his victory over Khrushchev and the release of the prisoners have been prudent. He has continued air surveillance, but has avoided other provocative moves. The fact is that an invasion of Castro's Cuba is foredoomed unless the United States is prepared to fight a full-scale war, which, with some 15,000 Russians still on the ground, could easily escalate into World War III. Cuba is not Guatemala, and Mr. Kennedy and his advisers now know it.

For their part, the Messrs. Castro and Khrushchev have exercised an equivalent measure of good sense. Every day they have an opportunity to shoot down U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, and every day they forbear. Mr. Castro, in fact, seems to have adopted the policy advocated for the United States by Charles Osgood — make a harmless conciliatory move, and see whether the opponent reciprocates (*The Nation*, January 5). Of late, Mr. Castro has been launching such initiatives almost daily — permitting American newsmen to take a look-around, releasing civilians to swell the refugee population in Miami, returning some drugs not needed, etc. And despite such miscues as the Orange Bowl "spectacular," the President has been acting in a manner that implies an effort to reduce tensions by reciprocal actions (see the article by Leslie Dewart on page 113), which may account for his attempts to spike the guns of Messrs. Dirksen, Goldwater, Keating, et al., who remain addicted to the "arsenic and old lace" fantasies of Teddy Roosevelt charging up San Juan Hill.

Arms and the Woman

After the rout of the experienced warriors of the House Un-American Activities Committee, last December, by the Women Strike for Peace, some of the ladies returned to Washington, carrying bouquets this time, and leaving their babies at home. Their plan was to present one bouquet apiece to the Soviet, British and American delegates to the nuclear test-ban conference as a token of hope, gratitude and support. When the conference recessed, the ladies, unable to distinguish a Communist from any other male, thrust their entire stock on the first three conferees to come forth — Messrs. Tsarapkin, Dobrynin and Federenko. When the mistake was discovered, the Russians diplomatically handed back two bouquets and Britain's Ormsby-Gore graciously got out of his limousine to receive one of them. Since the American representative, Mr. William C. Foster, could not be located, the ladies presented the last bouquet, in slightly battered condition, to the American Broadcasting Company's John Scali, as a surrogate for Mr. Foster, and rushed to get the plane to New York in time to have dinner on the table.

They had better plan to come to Washington again, however. Whatever the outcome of the nuclear talks, there can be no peace, or prospect of peace, as long as the two great nuclear powers continue to manufacture nuclear bombs in the tens of thousands, and the President of the United States proposes an arms budget of $53.6 billion which, with extras, will be edging up toward $60 billion. According to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, in his two years in office Mr. Kennedy has managed to expand the military budget by over 20 per cent, and the usual obscure struggle is in progress to see who shall get what. "In the days of the 'missile gap,'" the *Post-Dispatch* points out, "Americans found they could not tolerate the possibility of Soviet superiority in nuclear power. Can the Russians tolerate our superiority any better than we could theirs?" And so will not the arms build-up continue *ad infinitum*, until the world explodes?

As Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania told the ladies of Women Strike for Peace, there is simply no opposition in the Congress to government spending, as long as it is military. There is little prospect of a test-ban treaty getting past the Senatorial war hawks, even if the Russians are willing. Hearings will be held on the arms budget but, if precedent is followed, no witness will be called who might object to the size of the budget, or who might throw any obstacle in the way of the insensate drive toward war. Yet there is such a witness, and he is not a Communist. On CBS Reports, January 23, ex-President Eisenhower was asked how he felt about the state of our defenses. "Adequate," he said, and added as a personal viewpoint: "I think we're spending too much money on it."

If the ladies will present some bouquets to the chairmen of the committees that will evaluate the arms budget, perhaps these mighty legislators will be willing to call General Eisenhower and get his views before speeding up the juggernaut.

Speak Up, Mr. Critic

The novel *Fail-Safe*, which warns that the passage of time and the rise of international pressures and technological complexity are steadily increasing the probability of war by accident, became an almost immediate bestseller. This success appears to have caused distress in official circles, for the book has been attacked by *Time* (after earlier laudatory comment), by a retired general in *Newsweek* and by a former SAC information officer in *America*. The burden of complaint is as follows: the particular accident which the authors, Burdick and Wheeler, invented could not happen, therefore the idea of accident is fallacious; further, the book is immoral, not to say un-American, since it implies that the custodians of our atom bombs are not infallible and distracts the public from its fixed gaze on the beastliness of the enemy. *We* cannot make mistakes and *they* do not deserve the benefit of the doubt.

Now comes Philip Wylie with *Triumph*, which projects the following nightmare: Some one of these days the Soviet Union will launch an unprovoked and an-

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nihilating attack on the United States. They will do this despite the fact that they are winning the cold war by diplomatic and economic means, and in full knowledge that America's capacity for posthumous retaliation will utterly erase Russia, China and the rest of the Communist world. The Soviets will be willing, nay eager, to accept this solar incineration because, undetected by any of our human or technological monitors, they will have built vast redoubts under their mountains and beneath their seas. In these they will secrete seed populations which in time will emerge and, possessing the only nuclear arms left on earth, will force the *Southern* Hemisphere into slavery under the original Communist nations, now in gaseous orbit around the earth.

Mr. Wylie tells his story as a mildly erotic Tom Swift adventure, involving fourteen Americans who survive in a private shelter that has cost its tycoon owner a minimum of $250 million and proves *just* adequate for the job. The interpersonal relations of the story need not detain the adult reader, but what, one wonders, will the authorities who depreciated the accuracy and morality of *Fail-Safe* have to say of *Triumph*? How plausible is it that the Russians could hollow out mountains, sink gigantic marine caissons and stock them for the sustenance of thousands of people for a period of at least two years without anyone in the West detecting their fiendish scheme? How likely is it that such "retreats" could withstand the total retaliatory power of the United States? And speaking of morality or patriotism, what is the propriety of a book which, at the very moment when the chance for an inspected test ban is the brightest in the long history of negotiation, fosters an image of the men in the Kremlin as creatures lost, not only to decency, but to the most basic logic — monsters whom we can only hate in impotent terror? It will be interesting to see what, if anything, the retired brass has to say of *Triumph*.

End of an Episode

On January 24, the Board of Education, City of New York, lifted the ban which another board — there is no overlap in the membership — had imposed on *The Nation* in 1948. At that time, the Board of Superintendents removed *The Nation* from the approved list because of a series of articles by Paul Blanshard, published between November, 1947, and June, 1948, which were later collected and published in expanded form as a book, *American Freedom and Catholic Power*. Since we have at all times held to the belief that the original ban was improperly imposed, we naturally take genuine satisfaction and pleasure in the decision of the new Board of Education which has restored *The Nation* to the approved library list for high schools (it was never banned in the municipal colleges).

Next Week

There are powerful political and economic forces working *for* disarmament as well as against it. Fred J. Cook discusses this unexpected development in "The Politics of Disarmament" to appear in next week's *Nation*.

OPENINGS FOR DIPLOMACY

1. Cracks in the Blocs . . . . . Fred Warner Neal

The cold war appears now to have entered a new phase, marked by fissures and schisms in both the Communist and Western blocs. The new phase offers to the United States an unprecedented opportunity for bold diplomatic moves which could ease world tensions and lessen the danger of thermonuclear war. At the same time, if the opportunity is muffed, it is a phase that may turn out to be more dangerous than any that preceded it.

First, the growing split between the Soviet Union and China should help destroy a favorite American cold-war myth — that there is a monolithic something called "international communism" which seeks to dominate the world by military aggression and/or fomentation of revolutions everywhere. Of course, there are those who will tell us that the rift is all a cunning Communist plot cooked up by Peking and Moscow to lull us into a false sense of security. But most Americans, including those in high policy-making circles, accept the reality of what has happened.

True, the Soviet-Chinese split largely concerns tactics, but in this case tactics is all important. The crux of the issue is Khrushchev's major revision of basic Marxist-Leninist theory at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. At this conclave, Khrushchev overruled the old dogma that war is an *inevitable* concomitant of capitalism, i.e., as long as capitalism exists, *ipso facto* there will be war.

The Chinese Communists have never flatly rejected this new theoretical position in so many words, but they have gone all out in opposing Khrushchev's interpretation of it. This interpretation is, essentially, that thermonuclear war would destroy the hopes of achieving universal communism and that, since this is so, agreements based on compromise with the capitalist nations are necessary. The Chinese deny that thermonuclear war would im-

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pede communism; they deny that meaningful agreements with capitalist countries are possible; and they insist that the Khrushchev doctrine slows up the tempo of Communist advance because it involves the eschewing of military intervention to assist new revolutionary regimes.

The Chinese are attracted particularly by Stalin's call, at the 19th Party Congress, for an aggressive (though not necessarily militarily aggressive) foreign policy toward underdeveloped areas. On the other hand, to the extent that Stalin opposed active intervention abroad to foment Communist revolutions, including China's own, the Chinese Communists for all their Stalin worship are going against one of the strongest principles of the cautious old dictator.

The very coming to China of communism in a way, and at a time, opposed by Stalin should have made it clear in the West — even if Yugoslavia had failed to do so — that Communist movements can stem from sources other than Moscow. Peking's open challenge of the Kremlin is an even more dramatic manifestation of this truth. Seen in this light, a good deal of American policy toward underdeveloped areas and neutralist countries stands in need of thorough re-examination.

Second, the Soviet-Chinese split reveals a good deal about Soviet policies and intentions. It seems clear that Khrushchev is sufficiently in earnest in his desire for a *détente* with the West that he is willing to risk a split in the Communist movement to achieve it. If anything, the more violent the Chinese opposition to his new position, the more stoutly he has asserted it, even though it means an obvious weakening of the Communist movement as a whole. Indeed, despite the fact that Khrushchev's experience with the West has been less than altogether happy since his espousal of the new doctrine, in some of his recent pronouncements he has come close to saying that Communist China, rather than the imperialist West, is the real source of danger in the world today.

In a sense, the Soviet Premier's willingness to force the issue with China is an earnest of his willingness to compromise in order to achieve a *détente* with the West. This in no wise means that the USSR will back down on positions it considers vital to its security — e.g., Berlin; or that it has given up support of new revolutionary regimes — e.g., Cuba. But clearly it does mean that the USSR will bend over backwards to avoid a military showdown, which is exactly what has been happening both in Berlin, where the Russians have local military superiority, and in Cuba where they do not.

The split among the Western powers is also over a matter of tactics. Whereas China feels that bowing to Soviet leadership will jeopardize Chinese interests, France feels that bowing to American leadership will jeopardize French interests. There is something to be said for both the Chinese and French attitudes, in the narrow sense of immediate national interests. A Soviet-American *détente* at this time certainly would make more difficult the achievement of twin Chinese goals: the return of Formosa and the elimination of the threat posed by hostile forces on the offshore islands and in Korea and Japan. Similarly, President de Gaulle — who is by no means alone among Europeans in his thinking — is quite right in seeing as a possibility, at least, a case where the United States might feel some threat to France did not warrant risking destruction of the American homeland and would not, therefore, produce American thermonuclear intervention.

And this brings us to the third major facet of the new phase of the cold war. The French refusal to accept our nuclear domination points up the fallacy of the long to-do over the defense of Western Europe: *If* the Russians had any intention of attacking Western Europe, NATO's conventional forces — even were they as strong in fact as they are on paper — could not stand against them; further, some of our Western European allies do not believe our unilateral control of thermonuclear weapons provides an effective deterrent. There are other aspects of the French position, but this is the main point. Since this is so, someday somebody is going to stand up and ask why, if the danger of Soviet attack is so great and the defenses are so inadequate, the Soviet Union has not attacked before this. The answer, long since given by George Kennan and others, is that there *never has been* any Soviet military threat to Western Europe — that is to say, the king doesn't have any clothes on.

Macpherson: Toronto Star

"With friends like these, who needs enemies?"

Be that as it may, both the Soviet-Chinese clash and the rift in the Western alliance could spell danger unless a cold-war *détente* is soon reached. There can be little question that the Soviet Union has been a restraining force on China, and some Westerners who so eagerly anticipated discord between the two may soon be having second thoughts about it. Were the split to become absolute, the Chinese, in their efforts to demonstrate that they were the vanguard of communism, might unleash all manner of aggressive action. There is evidence that many Asian Communist parties prefer Mao's stand to Khrushchev's. If Khrushchev cannot show concrete results, sooner or later, from his efforts to seek agreement with the West, we have no assurances that the Soviet course may not also change. China may be a paper tiger, with nothing but a loud roar and 700 million people to feed. But few would be so sanguine as to predict that this always will be the case. A Communist China with thermonuclear bombs, in conflict with the United States and aggressively seeking leadership of the Communist movement, is not a happy vision.

Nor can one be happy to contemplate the future of the course charted by de Gaulle. If France is to have its own thermonuclear capacity, it is virtually certain that West Germany will not lag far behind. And that would indeed open a Pandora's box. For regardless of West German policy, the Soviet reaction would doubtless be harsh. With several European countries plus China having the H-bomb, the whole unmanageable "nth country" problem, in all its ugliness, would be upon us.

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The danger of thermonuclear war from human or mechanical accident is already great; under such conditions, it would be magnified a thousandfold.

However, if a *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union can be reached, and thermonuclear disarmament achieved *before* other countries develop their own thermonuclear capability, there is great reason to believe that both France and Germany, as well as China, might forgo acquiring H-bombs. Certainly no disarmament agreement is worth anything without these countries in it. But this presupposes there is a disarmament agreement for them to come into. And this in turn, for the present, depends on agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The failure to achieve a *détente* thus far is by no means entirely the fault of the United States, but it is equally true that we have not done all we could to achieve it. Among the many factors which have inhibited us in this connection, two stand out. One is our belief that the Soviet Union, by its very nature, poses the threat of military aggression. The extreme oversimplification, if not the falsity, of this belief should now be more apparent as a result of the Soviet-Chinese split. Another inhibiting factor is our inability to obtain agreement among our Western European allies for an approach to the Soviet Union. But if there is no unity in the Western bloc anyway, the lack of it should no longer stand in the way of our unilateral approach to Moscow. And bilateral negotiation — between the United States and the Soviet Union —constitutes the best chance for success. In short, the rift in the Western bloc, if it frees us from over-concern with what the French or what the Germans will think or do, may be a blessing in disguise.

In the last analysis, everything depends on what Washington will do. And here the portents give cause for cautious optimism. There is reason to believe that President Kennedy, after having proved — to himself, to the country, to our allies and to the Russians — that he dared risk thermonuclear war, as he did in the Cuban affair, has since been motivated by a desire to meet the Russians halfway. The restraint in his public utterances has been remarkable. He has declared that our foreign policy should serve American interests—hardly a novel concept, but it may indicate a desire to cut loose from the restraints of Paris and Bonn. He has moved to compromise in regard to on-site inspection. He has halted thermonuclear testing. And he has ordered dismantling of our missile bases in Turkey and Italy.

Although these are important moves, they are hardly substantive. But if they indicate new thinking on basic issues, then they could be signs that President Kennedy is working out a new phase in foreign policy to meet the new phase in the cold war. Such a course would be in keeping with his undoubted intelligence and courage as well as with the image that many Americans still have of him. One can only hope it is so.

2. Cuba: Catalyst of Peace . . . . . Leslie Dewart

The current easy interpretation of the Cuban crisis that the newspapers have generally provided, and which the U.S. Government has encouraged, may well satisfy all those who feel that Russia's aggressiveness is the simple and only cause of all our international frustrations. It is an interpretation, however, which makes no sense whatever unless one disregards the majority of the well-known facts. According to the common view, details aside, Russia attempted a "power play," that is, she attempted to shift the military balance of terror by placing missile bases in Cuba. She did this under cover of deception—and failed because she miscalculated Kennedy's determination. Faced with a Cuban blockade, she then ignominiously retreated, and we all hope she learned her lesson.

The least important objection to this story is that it is inconsistent. If Russia was deceptive, then she must have feared being found out. Therefore she must have known that the United States would not tolerate missile bases in Cuba. If so, the miscalculation theory falls to the ground. Moreover, the existence of the bases could not have been kept secret forever. And what would be the point of secrecy, in any event? A deterrent must be *known* to be credible. Secrecy concerning the *existence* of missile bases is an absurdity. But it is pointless to list the inconsistencies of the theory: all its essential premises are, in point of fact, false.

Note, in the first place, that neither the missile bases nor the bombers added significantly to Russia's *deterrent* capability. The power-play theory equivocates between deterrent and offensive capability: unless the power-play theory includes the idea that Russia was planning an *actual attack* on the United States, then, the bases simply added—as Kennedy himself put it—to an already present danger. In short, the missiles could not have broken the stalemate of nuclear deterrence: they could not even have budged it. Second, there never was any actual physical secrecy concerning the bases, the missiles or the bombers: it was not by chance, or by Russian miscalculation, that we found out about them. Every part of the operation took place in the open; we knew about every aspect of it in detail almost as soon as it happened. Third, Russia could not have miscalculated the American response, because no calculation was necessary: the United States openly committed itself to forbid offensive capability to Cuba before bombers and missiles arrived there. Finally, if we consider the net results that, in fact, have obtained from Russia's policy, the possibility that the policy was undertaken in full knowledge and expectation of the results becomes entertainable.

Let us take first the matter of world opinion, because it is least important. No doubt, the Russian "retreat" has caused great emotional

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satisfaction in the United States. It also has shown, however, that Khrushchev *does* retreat, that he is not a reckless, power-mad maniac who will stop at nothing to satisfy his ambitions. Elsewhere, in Japan, for example, and in Great Britain and France, not to mention the Afro-Asian countries, many people go so far as to think that the newly revealed American "toughness" cannot be viewed without misgiving.

More important, however, is the fact that in provoking the United States to go to the brink of war over Cuba (yet, on the whole, quite safely from Russia's viewpoint, since not only did she build into the policy certain safeguards against an American "first strike," but was prepared beforehand to yield to the American response), Russia chose an area in which the United States would have to go to the brink alone—or, at least, in no better company than Haiti, Panama, Nicaragua, etc. For it had never been a secret that the Cuban policy of the United States had not met with the approval of her NATO allies. Even Canada, where popular sympathies most faithfully reflect American opinion, remained not consulted; and naturally so, for there would have been no point to consultations. Not a single NATO country backed the blockade; the vague reassurances of friendship received by Washington carefully avoided any commitment of any sort. Even the O.A.S. extended its verbal comfort in formulas that fell short of those requested. For the first time since the inception of the cold war, the United States faced Russia during a major crisis *alone*.

This does not mean, of course, that the advantage thus accruing to Russia is in every respect a disadvantage to Washington. In fact, this newly found degree and kind of isolation had discernible antecedents and now seems not entirely distasteful to the United States. Indeed, this isolationist trend increased in subsequent weeks: it emerged clearly at the Nassau meeting and, finally, it was publicly avowed by Kennedy on New Year's Day as part of his policy. It is, for all that, a result which Russia can be safely thought to have desired and perhaps to have sought by her Cuban missile policy. Nor is it necessarily a disadvantage to the cause of peace. The beginnings of a third power bloc, a united Europe that would be a buffer between the United States and Russia, also had been discernible before this, but the self-imposed, Russian-facilitated isolation of the United States since last October seems to have accelerated the process.

There is another consequence of Russia's policy which, at least from Cuba's point of view, was alone worth the price of the denouement and which, from the Kremlin's point of view, should eventually yield enough prestige to compensate several times over for her retreat. I refer to the fact that both *diplomatically* and *militarily*, Cuba has emerged a net winner in the complicated transaction. The United States has now modified her Cuban policy in one major respect: it has made discreetly clear that it will not attack Cuba, directly or indirectly. It appears that a U.S.-Cuban bargain has been struck which makes a formal American no-invasion pledge unnecessary. Cuba is, *de facto*, permitting U.S. aerial inspection, that is, renouncing offensive capability, and the token of her unspoken pledge is that she is not protesting American overflights or attempting to shoot down the intruding aircraft. The United States, in turn, has *de facto* undertaken not to attack or subvert Cuba, and the token of this unspoken pledge is the cessation of the subversive activities in which it had engaged up to October 20, on the eve of the crisis, under cover of the exiles.

Militarily, too, the net result of Russia's missile policy is most advantageous to Cuba. Until last summer, Cuba's defensive capability was mediocre; today, she has emerged from the crisis impregnable to any attack short of direct, all-out war. If Cuba's new weaponry does not itself guarantee this, one must consider the presence of Russian troops in what appears to be division-strength. As of today, the United States cannot attack Cuba unless it is prepared *first* to attack Russia herself.

As for Russia's military gain, her diplomacy seems to have netted the beautifully paradoxical result of having deterred, more or less indefinitely, an American attack on Cuba without making any actual commitment to defend Castro from such an attack. From the military point of view alone, Russian strategy appears not unlike that of the dishonest automobile salesman: ask so much more than you are willing to settle for as to let the customer think that, in the end, *he* cheated *you*. There are signs that this principle has not exhausted its usefulness in Russian hands.

Finally, and most important, Russia's decision to enter into military ties with Cuba brought to the United States the beginning of the realization that a basic decision must be made soon, and made *consciously*, on a vital question. This is whether the United States shall henceforth guide herself by the principle that war with communism is really inevitable, or by the principle that "peaceful coexistence" is actually possible and, indeed, the only alternative to war. For to Russia, the theory which underlies American bipartisan foreign policy —as initiated by Eisenhower and as consecrated by Kennedy—i.e., the theory of *the permanent postponability of war*, may well seem in practice to mean the ascendancy of both governmental drift over conscious decision and of the American people's intolerance over their patience. Its supposed permanence belied by its inherent instability, the theory might well seem to the Russians but a blind, compulsive, anarchic, self-deceptive, uncontrollable slow-motion skid toward an unwanted war.

It may be, therefore, that one of the main purposes of Russia's missile policy in Cuba was to bring home to the American people and government the conviction that, in truth, the choice is between an ultimate war in which no one can emerge the victor, and a stable peace in which no one can be perfectly happy but in which, at least, there will be a reasonable guarantee that we shall all live to be unhappy. Perhaps Russia wanted to convince America that, above all, this is a real choice, and that whatever happens will be the result of decisions made by men.

One need not share Russia's motivation in order to agree that a permanently postponed war is a permanently postponed peace as well. If so, perhaps one might, for one's own reasons, also agree that whatever encourages conscious decisions on the part of any government is desirable by anyone who is partial to the cause of peace. This

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is particularly true of the United States. For if one believes—as I believe—in the sincere American desire for peace, then one must also believe that in the long run, and once the elation of the apparent success of brinkmanship wears off, it is hardly conceivable that the United States would *consciously* persist in its drifting course toward war. On the basis of this *faith*, I would dare predict that the United States will eventually admit the real possibility of political settlements with nations and systems which, even if evil and ambitious, can be presumed to share with the just and the temperate the self-interested desire to survive the perils, if not the guilt, of war in the nuclear age.

FARMERS: the REAL SURPLUS . . Peter Dorner

Each year Congress struggles with a seemingly insoluble dilemma known as the "farm problem," a controversial public issue since the 1920s. Since then, numerous solutions have been proposed and many farm programs enacted. But the problem persists.

Fundamentally, the problem is one of economic reorganization. There are too many farmers on too many farms that are too small for profitable operation with modern machine technology. With shrinking profit margins per unit of output (declining prices and rising costs), income per farmer can be increased only by expanding the volume of sales. Productivity per farm worker is increased in large measure by investments in modern equipment. The productive potential of the equipment, in turn, is realized —and the farmer's income improved—by enlarging the farm. In recent years almost one-half of all land sales have been for farm-enlargement purposes. Consequently, the number of farms declined over 30 per cent in the 1950s.

Significantly, this reorganization of agriculture is more or less limited by the rate at which farmers are retiring. Once established, a farm family finds it increasingly difficult to leave the farm. With present high unemployment rates, opportunities for a farmer unskilled in industrial work are not very great. Given these conditions, we cannot expect a short-term solution. An industry consisting of more than three million firms, where mergers depend largely on family retirements, cannot be reorganized in a few short years; the process may take another generation or more.

Agriculture is involved in a technological revolution that is still gaining momentum. For example, in 1820, each farm worker could produce enough food for himself and four others. This figure was doubled by 1920; it was again doubled between 1920 and 1950. By 1961, each farm worker produced enough for himself and twenty-six others. It appears that the next doubling, therefore, will be achieved in a mere fifteen years.

Present economic organization in farming is inconsistent with this new technology, and until this situation is remedied, effective production control will be difficult to achieve. It is only reasonable, therefore, to expect that farm surpluses will continue for many years. Production control is difficult for two reasons:

1: *The enormous thrust of new machine technology, which can be employed efficiently only as output is expanded.* This technology is developed outside the farm sector (farm-supply corporations and public experiment stations) and is available to all farmers. Some farmers can enlarge their farms and utilize the new technology effectively. But even those tied to small acreage are under great pressure to adopt the new techniques in an attempt to maintain their relative income position.

2: *The great range of technological and farm-size conditions existing within any type of farming area.* Over two-thirds of all *commercial* farms in this country have *gross* sales of less than $10,000 per year. Most of these are too small for economical operation with modern machine methods. Such farmers will find it difficult to accept major cutbacks in production, since they are striving for (and, in some cases, near to achieving) a size of unit which gives them a good income. And enlargement, as pointed out above, is possible only as some farmers retire and make land available for expansion.

Farm-support programs directed at raising prices to offset the losses resulting from effective production control are misdirected. The farm problem is not fundamentally a price problem; it is one of economic reorganization. Where reorganization is attained, the present price level, or even a lower one, may be quite satisfactory. Effective production control will also become feasible as reorganization becomes more widespread. Thus the degree of compulsion—and, consequently, of effectiveness—acceptable in a production-control program becomes a function of the progress in economic reorganization. On this basis, we should expect wider acceptance of an effective control program for wheat, where reorganization has progressed very rapidly, than for dairy farming, where the new technologies have yet to make their full impact.

A current view is that government is not providing farmers with *enough* withholding power, and the results are surpluses and declining prices. Experience of other industries is cited (e.g., steel and automobiles) to show that they meet the same problem by simply holding idle an appropriate proportion of their excess capacity. Agriculture, it is said, should follow this example.

Up to a point, the argument is valid. But pressing the analogy too far ignores the fact that the manufacturers of steel and automobiles have at present an economic organization consistent with their production technology. Thus an unqualified parallel between agriculture and these industries is unwarranted.

Price supports and production control must indeed be looked upon as the long-range programs. They will become more effective than they have been only after much of

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the present diversity in organizational circumstances has been reduced. Even then, they still will be required, since the differences in the competitive structure between farming and manufacturing will likely remain. In the meantime, programs directed at the farmers' price-income problem can be no more than a holding action to alleviate as much as possible the painful reorganization adjustments that must be made. We must continue to control production as best we can, but we should not expect a quick solution.

It follows that a reduction in farm-program costs is unlikely. These costs cannot really be eliminated; they can only be shifted from one group in society to another. Greater reliance on free-market forces and lower prices shifts the burden to the farmer-producer. A movement in the direction of more rigid production controls and higher prices shifts the cost onto the consumer's grocery bill. In the latter case, while government costs of supporting farm prices would be reduced, *government costs of maintaining present volume of exports would be increased.* Over one-half of all agricultural exports are already subsidized; with higher domestic prices, subsidies would then go up.

Present policy shifts part of the cost of farm-support programs to the consumer through higher prices at the store; another part is shifted to the U. S. Treasury to be paid from taxes. This is a reasonable arrangement, quite consistent with our basic principle of progressive taxation. Shifting the entire cost to consumers via the grocery bill would be regressive—a disproportionate share being borne by the lower-income groups. By shifting a significant part of the cost onto the general taxpaying public, the progressive principle operates — payment in accordance with ability to pay.

Actually, present preoccupation with reducing the government cost of farm programs is misdirected effort—although, of course, it would be welcomed if *all* government expenditures could be reduced. Paying taxes is an onerous task. But this is not the issue. The real question is whether government price-support programs, when added to the consumer's grocery bill, have resulted in a disproportionate increase in the price of farm products.

In 1950, the cost per person of farm products at *farm prices* was $187. In 1960, it was $189, an increase of slightly over 1 per cent. This is a negligible increase in light of the greater 1960 per capita consumption of total farm products and especially the increase in high-value foods like meats.

Government costs of farm-price supporting activities need to be added. The accounting procedures of the U. S. Department of Agriculture do not permit an easy separation of the net costs associated with these activities. The following esti-



mating procedure gives the maximum figure.

Annual costs fluctuate and I have therefore taken an average of the last seven fiscal years, 1956-62. The average annual cost of farm-income stabilization and food-for-peace over this period was $4.1 billion. (It is, of course, debatable whether food-for-peace costs should be charged against our food bill; but, as indicated, I am interested in showing a maximum figure.) Dividing this figure by the 1959 population of 177 million (the mid-point in the seven-year average) gives a cost of $23 per person per year. Assuming no government costs for 1950 (again liberalizing the estimate, since there were some costs involved), the appropriate comparison of the cost per person of farm products *at farm prices plus government costs* is $187 for 1950 and $212 for 1960. This represents a 13.3 per cent increase.

During the last decade, the consumer price index increased from 100 (1947-49) to 126.5 in 1960. Farm prices actually declined, and the cost of food per person, *including* government costs, rose only half as fast as the general consumer price level—this, to repeat, in spite of increased quantities and much improved quality of food purchased. Food, priced at the farm, has been the only major deflationary influence throughout the decade. Store prices have indeed gone up, but these price increases are not to be associated with the unprocessed farm products, but with the marketing services added between farmer and consumer.

This is not a defense of particular farm programs or the methods used for supporting farm incomes. Yet, if the above interpretation of the farm problem is valid, substantial government costs in one form or another will be incurred for some years to come.

These costs must be evaluated in the light of the above facts. They are analogous in many respects to unemployment compensation in the nonfarm sector. In both cases, they represent the cost of maintaining production capacity in excess of that required to meet demand at present prices and patterns of income distribution.

In industry, the excess capacity takes the form of idle plants and unemployed workers. Here, costs are shared by the *individual firm*, the *laborer*, the *general public through taxation* and the *consuming public via the price level* which, in the industrial economy of administered prices, reflects the cost of maintaining excess capacity. This is precisely the way costs are shared in maintaining the excess farm capacity, although the proportionate shares are different.

In farming, the excess capacity also appears in part as idle plant (land in the Soil Bank and Feed Grain Program) and *under-employed* workers; but a large part appears in the form of surplus commodities. Industry, with greater control through economic concentration and with an economic organization consistent with its technology, has the ability to idle capacity *before* products are forthcoming. This is also the intent of farm programs, but the biological nature of agricultural production, the wide geographic dispersion of many small firms and the great diversity in farm size and technical levels of production make control more difficult.

Some will deny the validity of this analogy. Unemployment compensation has always been considered a temporary payment in time of recession or movement between

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jobs. But we need to re-evaluate this concept. Investment in new technology displaces workers in industry as well as in agriculture. Non-agricultural employment is rising, but unemployment is not declining significantly. In the 1960s, there will be almost double the 1950 annual total of new workers entering the labor force. Unemployment has been near or over 6 per cent since the 1958 recession.

Farm-program costs and unemployment-compensation costs have had similar growth patterns over the last decade. In the early 1950s, both were well under $1 billion annually; by the latter 1950s and early 1960s, they each rose to over $3 billion. These high levels of unemployment are, of course, unacceptable and should be reduced. But we are moving into a new technological era in both industry and farming in which our capacity to produce commodities is enlarged primarily by investment in machine technology rather than expansion of jobs for workers. At present, our ability to economize labor seems to exceed our ability to create new jobs.

Unemployment costs, like the cost of farm programs, can be avoided only by placing the burden on the group directly involved. But this is not eliminating the cost; it is merely shifting the burden and altering the consequences. Our basic approach has been to share these costs widely since, unlike the days of our frontier experience, individuals are no longer capable of controlling the conditions necessary for their full employment.

The basic bottleneck in "solving" the farm problem is the rate of adjustment and reorganization in agriculture. Can this process be speeded up?

If unemployment were reduced and more city jobs opened up, more farmers might make their farms available for the enlargement of those remaining. Modification in farm-credit arrangements, with some system of shared ownership as in industry, would make it possible for farmers to acquire land thus made available. There are still too many small farms being transferred as operating units which should be combined with existing farms. New credit arrangements could be devised which would favor the buyer who needed the land for enlarging his unit and discriminate against the buyer who is interested in becoming established on a unit that is now or soon will be too small for effective operation.

It has been suggested that the government pay individuals and families on small farms to move out of agriculture. This is a theoretical possibility, and a move in the right direction, but it is not a practical alternative. A politician is reluctant to vote for funds to be used for moving people out of his district.

The above measures are directed primarily at reorganization within agriculture. But there are accompanying problems. First and foremost is the education of rural youth. Most of the young people now on farms will have to seek jobs in the cities. Unskilled labor will become increasingly superfluous in our age of mechanization and automation. These young people must be assured of a high-quality education. Likewise, those who remain to run the large farms of the future will need a better education than many of our rural schools presently provide. With declining population, increased financial aid to rural communities may be necessary to provide the better schooling.

A fundamental question must now be posed: Why deplete the population in small rural communities

(*Continued on page 125*)

The Military Budget

TUG-OF-WAR . . . . . Jerry Greene

They are called "posture hearings," but what's in progress now before the House Armed Services Committee deserves a better name. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has begun the Pentagon's marathon presentation of the $53.7 billion military budget for fiscal 1964. This year, the production is packed with explosive controversy and emotional overtones—not to overlook massive economics, the national pride of other nations and pure politics here at home—which already have rocked a British Cabinet and brought anguished cries from labor unions and corporate managements from one end of this country to the other.

In its first, rough draft, McNamara's prepared testimony covered more than 250 pages. For he realized he had not only to explain and justify the proposed expenditures, but also to meet head-on the challenges of aroused legislators who questioned his decisions. He knew, too, that he had on his hands a smoldering revolt of an Air Force fearful of the imminent disappearance of the last manned *heavy* bomber. And once more there was the question of slide-rule civilians overriding professional military judgment.

Specifically, McNamara and the other Administration witnesses were being challenged on half a dozen or more vital decisions and actions, all dealing with the fate of the Air Force. At the top of the list was the cancellation of the Skybolt missile contract which had so aroused the half-informed among the British. Then (not necessarily in order of importance) there were the Air Force role in manned space operations, the continued refusal of the Pentagon to spend more for the RS-70 bomber, the McNamara disregard of a military committee's recommendation on the award of the multi-billion-dollar TFX fighter aircraft contract, the feud between the Air Force and the Army over close support and battlefield mobility and the lingering delay in getting into production on the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile. There were more.

Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees get the full "posture" briefings and testimony while they are considering the $15 billion authorization bill for procurement of aircraft, ships and weapons. The entire affair is work-

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ed over in detail by the House and Senate Defense Appropriations subcommittees. This quadruple presentation will last two or more months; and if the zest for combat lingers, the fussing can spill over onto the House and Senate floors.

The posture hearings offer the big show for the public, though much of the testimony is taken behind closed doors. But censored versions are released. And it is here that aroused generals and admirals find a forum for personal views which are inevitably sought by friendly legislators.

This year, in particular, the Air Force finds itself pausing for reassessment because of the advances in technology, the high cost of modern weapons and hard civilian decisions. The Army, for the moment, is doing all right with its long-overdue modernization program. The Navy steams happily ahead astride the Polaris missile submarine program. It is to the Air Force that the Congress will be addressing most of its volatile attention for the next three months.

While the Air Force has been catching its lumps these last few years, and although Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) said in December he could not see a future for the Air Force if Skybolt was dropped, the proposed new budget allocates Air $20.7 billion compared with $15.5 for the Navy and $13.1 for the Army. This doesn't look like quick oblivion.

The push-button-warfare dreamers might be surprised to discover that the largest single procurement item in the 1964 defense budget, $6.4 billion, is proposed for the purchase of manned aircraft. Because of differences of opinion over strategy (whatever that has come to mean) and economic impact, the future of the manned bomber (and manned military spacecraft) vis-à-vis the intercontinental missile is at the bottom of the biggest fuss that is now stewing around the Air Force.

Even as the announcement that Skybolt had to go was being drafted, Senator A. Willis Robertson (D., Va.), acting chairman of the Defense Appropriation subcommittee and a sturdy, non-inflammatory type, was warning in a statement against "putting all of our eggs in the long-range-missile basket." Senator A. S. (Mike) Monroney (D., Okla.), an Administration friend and chairman of the Aviation subcommittee of the Commerce Committee, branded the cancellation "a very dangerous gamble" with the nation's security.

It was in the face of this kind of thinking by serious legislators who have access to top military secrets that McNamara had to present not only an explanation of his actions, but also a positive program for unprecedented peacetime spending—a program which Congress probably will approve eventually without drastic change.

So far as can be determined, this nation's basic strategy as it pertains to Russia hasn't been changed in a dozen years despite the mauling given the word by statesmen, politicians and numerous volunteer experts. The nation has, and expects to maintain, nuclear superiority over Russia. None the less, substantial conventional forces, air, sea and ground, have been retained since Korea. NATO was created and has been building up, although much too slowly to satisfy the military professionals. There has never been a time since Korea when the President had only the single choice between all-out nuclear war or nothing. Former President Eisenhower demonstrated that in Lebanon and the Formosa Straits.

What the Kennedy Administration did do was to pour out the cash to get some of the things thought to be badly needed for supporting the strategy that already existed. This meant more airlift and more new rifles, tanks, ICBMs and Polaris submarines and—spurred by Berlin—the troops needed to flesh out and make fully combat-ready the divisions already in Europe. The President got a lot more teeth for the options for action which lay at hand. The military men were mightily cheered.

And the military got something else many of the professionals have had difficulty understanding — a wholesale shake-up of the Pentagon structure which Congress had authorized in the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act. This reorganization, no doubt, hurt the Air Force the most, but the airmen might as well get used to it. The old days, when the relatively independent Army, Air Force and Navy made their own decisions, wooed and were wooed by pets in Congress who fought like tigers for a favored viewpoint (and perhaps a few favors in return, like contract awards in a Congressional district) appear to be vanishing.

Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric laid it on the line in a speech to manufacturers on January 25. Gilpatric knew the parochial viewpoint; he was Under Secretary of the Air Force more than ten years ago. Gilpatric told his audience that a Defense Secretary today has but two choices, because the principal roles of the military now generally cut across service lines:

> *One is to conceive of his function as primarily policy-making with his determinations backed up by fiscal sanctions, that is, budget ceilings. Under this concept, most of the decision-making in such important areas as military planning and programming would be handled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the principal commands and in other significant areas by the Service Secretaries and their staffs.*
>
> *Under the other concept, the Secretary of Defense retains in his own hands, assisted by his civilian and military advisers, the basic decision-making power in all of the areas just mentioned, leaving to the military and civilian components of the services and the commands the responsibility for executing his decisions and performing the operations called for by them.*

The advent of missiles had sent the three service branches running hog-wild after their own military rainbows to the point where even Congress was alarmed and investigated. For those who weep over the lost $500 million in the Skybolt investment, it may be recalled that a Senate committee discovered that, in the three years preceding submission of the 1961 fiscal budget, the Pentagon had canceled defense contracts totaling $3,452 billion. Each of the more than two dozen contracts involved had been an avowed necessity for national security when Congress shelled out the taxpayers' cash for the project. The Air Force blew $679.8 million on the Navaho missile alone; the Navy kissed off $352 million on the P6M jet seaplane.

McNamara, feeling an urgency which the Berlin crisis and the Russian missiles in Cuba may have justified, put a premium on achieving maximum strength *now*. As he is again telling Congress, he has held strictly to one ground rule, his

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order from the President: "Develop the force deemed necessary to protect the security of the nation." And as for strategy, there has been no deviation from his insistence that, nuclear or conventional, the United States will use whatever force may be required to meet its objective at any given point.

The differences arise over opinions as to when, and under what circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons might be necessary, and how they could be delivered most effectively.

These are the differences now being aired in the Congressional committees. They are difficult to simplify because they are in many instances so involved and so technical. They are over-simplified frequently for political, economic and emotional reasons and this leads too often only to confusion. Extremists on both sides don't help much, either.

The B-70 bomber, now renamed the RS-70 with a new concept of operations, won't fly in its first prototype until April, if present schedules hold fast. Yet this is one of the oldest of the current points of controversy now bedeviling the Air Force. The aircraft was conceived in 1953 as a 2,000-mile-per-hour successor to the old faithful B-52. It was to become operational in 1964. The first cutback in funds came in 1958. A year later, the administration decided to drop development and spend more money on big missiles. Late in 1960, the aircraft was given brief fresh favor, but not much.

Then came the switch to the RS-70 — reconnaissance-strike — wherein the aircraft, using an incredible new radar system, would be used to keep watch on the effects of missile shots and hit new or undamaged or mobile targets.

Congress liked the RS-70. Its projected performance was dramatic and impressive. But—like the preceding administration, only more so—the Kennedy people found they could get massive striking power faster and cheaper with ICBMs than with a fleet of RS-70s. Then there was the matter of vulnerability—a matter of such import that some airmen will bet even money that the RS-70 never gets off the ground as a major operational project. It is believed that Russia has, or will have shortly, a growing force of

Defense vs. Social Services: "Better luck next time, kid."

Polaris submarines, or something similar. A flock of such vessels, well offshore in the Atlantic and Pacific with weapons zeroed in on SAC bomber bases, could be hurtful and there would be little warning time in event of a strike.

The bomber-minded Congress, heeding the considered judgment of Air Force professionals, brushing aside protests from McNamara, increased requested funds for the B-70 in 1961 from $220 million to $400 million. There was an additional appropriation of $515 million for B-52 or B-58 bombers, money the Pentagon had not requested. The extra funds were not spent for those purposes. McNamara testified that it would cost more than $1 billion to buy a wing of B-52 bombers, with essentials such as tankers and missiles, and keep it flying for five years. The same money, he said, would buy 250 Minuteman missiles in hardened sites.

The B-58 bomber was not one of the Air Force's more boastful projects. It is a fantastic airplane of high performance, but the Air Force only bought two wings of them; cost: about $2 billion.

Three test RS-70 planes are being built, but without weapons systems and in a program which the Air Force protests bitterly won't allow a fair chance for judgment of capabilities. But McNamara is telling Congress he wants only $81 million to continue the project in 1964 and is determined to limit the cost of the development to $1.3 billion. Last year Congress appropriated $362.6 million for its production, compared to $171 million asked. What's worrisome to the Air Force is that now, for the first time in more than twenty-five years, there is no new bomber under active development as such. The B-47 fleet will soon be junked and the B-52 will be obsolescent by the end of the decade.

McNamara has told Congress he sees a strategic force for the calendar year 1966 of 700 bombers (B-52s and B-58s); more than 1,100 land-based ICBMs and more than 500 Polaris missiles aboard submarines. He feels that there will be an adequate mix of missiles and manned aircraft for the remainder of this decade under the present program. But the airmen think the logical continuation of present policies will lead to all ICBMs a few years thereafter; that the diminution of heavy, long-range bomber strength will rob the armed forces of the flexibility in great nuclear-power applications that the Secretary is demanding as he increases the conventional elements.

The Skybolt missile project overlaps the arguments over both the B-52 and the B-70. And from what has been said about it, one can only draw the conclusion that few of the protesting British knew what this weapon was for in the first place.

Anti-aircraft defenses the world around improved vastly during the 1950s through the development of rockets and missiles. The Air Force developed the Hound Dog, a jet-powered guided missile to be carried under the wings of the B-52. It has a range up to 500 miles. It would be fired at enemy air defenses — radar installations and rocket sites—while the bomber was at a safe distance away, theoretically knocking them out and allowing the intruding aircraft to reach the bomb-release line.

In 1957, the Air Force asked manufacturers to produce a ballistic missile which would do the same thing from 1,000 miles out. Hound Dogs might be shot down; the weapon which came to be known as Skybolt would travel at a speed of 9,500 miles an hour and could not be stopped.

The first contract for Skybolt was awarded in May, 1960. Later that year, the United States agreed to sell Britain exactly one hundred

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missiles, if the project succeeded. The Skybolt was a penetration aid, with its primary mission to work over air defenses so bombers could get to the target. SAC, and no doubt the British as well, have tactical plans they believe will insure that most of their bombers reach the targets; Skybolt would merely have provided additional insurance and would no doubt have been highly welcomed. But it is hard to see how the loss of one hundred Skybolts could totally wreck British atomic manhood. The smell of propaganda lingers.

Both the President's Science Advisory Committee and a weapons evaluation group in the Pentagon recommended killing Skybolt back in 1960. A review by the Kennedy Administration in the fall of 1961 brought a year's reprieve. Costs and delays ended it. McNamara is asking for another 150 Minuteman missiles which would be assigned as penetration aids, if required.

The Skybolt decision generated a lot of heat. There were reports that Douglas and Northrop Aircraft Companies would have to lay off 6,000 workers early this year because of it. E. R. White, vice president of the International Association of Machinists (AFL-CIO) said his union members were shocked and would make a "last ditch fight" for continuance of Skybolt. What that had to do with the desirability of the weapon seemed unimportant. But it gave McNarama more questions to answer from Congressmen representing plant areas.

Senate investigators with fire in their eyes have plunged into an inquiry of the TFX fighter-plane contract — a $690.3 million first nibble of an estimated $5 billion — when this was awarded to a General Dynamics-Grumman Aircraft combine.

When McNamara first reached the Pentagon, he was convinced that the Air Force and the Navy could use the same fighter aircraft, with a minimum of changes to meet specific requirements, such as a heavier landing gear for carrier operations. He had a difficult time convincing the generals and admirals he meant it. He finally got acceptance of one plane, the high-performance F-4B, for both services. It's a fine aircraft and will do for some years.

The Secretary was insistent that the F-4B's successor, then designated the TFX—experimental tactical fighter—also be designed for two services. But, it is said, both the Air Force and the Navy held back, as did some of their contractors. It is said that they gambled that the problem would prove too great and that eventually the Air Force and Navy would have their separate planes, as usual. There was heel-dragging. Two or three times, McNamara sent proposals back to a military committee as unsuitable and it finally dawned on somebody that when he said he wanted one plane, he meant it.

The military committee finally came up with a report saying it looked with more favor on a bid by Boeing Aircraft, but that the proposal of General Dynamics-Grumman was acceptable. McNamara took a long look, with Gilpatric, Navy Secretary Fred Korth and Air Secretary Eugene Zuckert, and ruled for General Dynamics-Grumman.

The Congress is getting his reasons. McNamara reported that the General Dynamics design was 85 per cent "compatible" compared to 60 per cent for Boeing, meaning that these percentages of the aircraft were suitable for both Air Force and Navy requirements. He testified that he knows something about production accounting and that the Boeing estimates, in his opinion, were far too low and would have to be raised substantially (as is too frequently done with estimated costs in defense contracts). He noted that Boeing, for more than twenty years, had concentrated on building big bombers and passenger and cargo aircraft, while Grumman had unquestioned experience and ability in fighter-plane production.

The new fighter, to be called F-111A, can fly at 1,800 miles an hour or better, land at eighty miles an hour on unpaved fields and has a fabulous range and bomb-carrying ability.

From the Secretary, the Congress was learning there was more unhappiness than fight between the Air Force and the Army over close-support and battlefield mobility. The Air Force fears the Army may try to move in and take over all close-support operations, no impossibility by any means; this, airmen feel, could not help but make for more confusion and duplication. The Army has been having a ball using, experimenting with and developing helicopters for battlefield use; the Air Force hasn't done much with them. But Vietnam has proved that helicopters are more vulnerable than had been supposed to ground fire. The Air Force has been trying to remind the Army that helicopters would be of no use at all without complete air superiority.

This business of Air Force-Army coordination in close-support matters is far from solution, and the answers may lie ahead in experimental projects now on the books.

In manned-space operations, there is a fundamental difference in approach — one which has plagued the military men since the days of the Wright brothers. In essence, the Air Force says, send us up there and let us look around and see what we can do with it; McNamara says, show me first what you think you can do, how you will do it and what it will cost and we'll see. Meanwhile, we'll build rocket boosters which will get you there when and if.

What this whole procurement report adds up to is the fact that a new breed of civilian "experts" is in the saddle at the Pentagon. The reins on the military have never been tighter. The findings of the (usually young) scientists, economists and lawyers — blended with some military opinion and advice, of course — are funneled upward to McNamara for decision.

Ironically, it was the Air Force that played a major role in elevating the scientists and economists to the status of strategic experts. The Air Force promoted the RAND Corporation to obtain technological advice after World War II, and within two years RAND had created divisions of economics and social science.

One of the economists, Dr. Bernard Brodie, in a paper published by a Senate committee, tells how the economists became strategists, and how they came up with the idea of using the dollar as a common measure of value in judging the performance of weapons systems where there was competition. There's an answer to the ICBM and RS-70 decisions and many another. It's a military-planning phenomenon without precedent, but at $50 billion per budget the system seems destined to linger awhile.

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Robert Frost: A Reminiscence

Roger Kahn

This is a strange night, heavy with death, unrelieved by miracles. Robert Frost is dead and my mortality and yours is thus more stark. Very soon I shall be telling young people that I knew him and what he said and how he smiled at my son, and the young people will look blank, and tolerant, as though I were speaking of Sophocles. In death, an hour is as centuries.

Yet one rejects such truth. "Grief work," is what psychiatrists call it. They say that minds adjust in ordered patterns to the multitudinous facts of tragedy, and it is odd that one should think of this, for Robert Frost stood, perhaps above all other things, for the pristine privacy of the mind.

He remarked two summers ago, on his steep green hill in Vermont, that some ask:

"What does this poem mean?"

"It means what it says."

"I know what it means to me, but I don't know what it means to you."

"Maybe, I don't want you to."

Frost wrote many kinds of poems about many kinds of things and he resented all attempts to explain or to restate what he had labored to produce. Once, when someone plagued him to "please explain that poem," he remarked, "Do you want me to say it in worse English?"

I knew Robert Frost and we talked of writing and baseball and politics and religion and love and lust and loneliness. And even death. He didn't want to die. He said he was too curious about "unfinished business. Us and Russia. How will that come out?"

I think I knew him well enough to disqualify myself as a critic, which is fortunate. A fine immediate criticism was written in London forty-nine years ago by a man who was killed in the First World War. "These poems," Edward Thomas commented of *North of Boston*, "are revolutionary because they lack the exaggeration of rhetoric." Final criticism is premature in 1963. Was Frost, as he himself liked to suggest, a culmination of New England culture, an end product of Longfellow, Emerson and a hostile soil? Or was he a precursor? Or was he both? As I say, answers are premature. Many still argue whether Mozart crowned Haydn or created Beethoven.

Many were confused by Robert Frost. They saw him as a gentle New Englander, which he was not. They saw him as a simple farmer, who wrote simple poems, which he did seldom. They saw him as a placid figure, forgetting, because he did not remind them, that his art, like his life, was wrought of restlessness and torture, as well as moments of controlled delight.

"You can quote me on anything," he once said, "except writers and writing."

"Why," I asked.

"Because," he said, triumphantly, "I'm not a critic."

That was his pride, a pride almost ferocious.

I think it is fair now to report some of our talk about writers and writing; fair and important because his words should be preserved. This was not idle talk. It built toward a philosophy.

"I was always afraid of rejection slips," he said. "I had to guard my pride. But when I went to England [in 1912, when Frost was thirty-six] I took a bunch of verses down to a little publisher in London — not a vanity press, mind you — and he liked them and he printed them. I'm not a literary man but after that they wanted me to join the literary life and asked me to a group that Pound ran.

"Economy. That was what Pound wanted. I write a poem and give it to you; you write it in fewer words. Six people sitting around a room, writing poems in fewer words. Pound said, 'Got a poem on you, Frost?' I pointed to my head. 'Up here.' I wrote it out and picked up a magazine:

Sea waves are green and wet
But up from where they die
Rise others vaster yet
And these are brown and dry.

They are the sea made land
To come at the fisher town
And bury in solid sand
The men she could not drown.

"Pound came back in a little while. 'Don't have too much on you, Frost. Took you forty-five words. Best I could do was forty-two.'

" 'Yes,' I told him, 'and destroyed my rhyme and destroyed my meter and probably destroyed my sense.' "

We were sitting in the cabin where Frost liked to spend his summers. Our chairs were pushed close together. Frost jabbed an elbow into my ribs. "That settled Pound's hash," he said. "He never tried to tell me how to write poetry again."

So he was fiercely proud of his art long before Presidents and college professors knew that the art existed, and he kept this pride, very much as it was, through all his years. "I don't change," he said. "I don't get over things. I don't even grow. They're a lot of fools, the people who say that you get over things, a love or a poem."

He rejected Pound's advice and Pound's way, but because Frost was for poetry, he never rejected Pound. He visited Pound at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington. Afterward, he summoned Sherman Adams and said that Pound ought to be freed.

"It is wrong to imprison poets," Frost said, explaining, later, "but since he's been free Pound has been writing me unpleasant letters. Scatalogical. He keeps using the word 'shit.' "

From Frost, the word shocked. My mouth fell.

"But that's not the worst thing," Frost said. "The worst is what he's doing to Eliot. He writes Eliot and says, 'I was wrong about you. You're not a good poet.' "

Frost cared about his guests; he was a gentleman. One does not leave guests shocked.

He believed, as did Shakespeare, in the sound of words, in the immediacy of the phrase, in the transcendent fact of rhythm. "Could you ever teach rhythm," I asked him once, as we stood on the hill near sunset.

"No," he said, touching his ear. "It's either there or not."

"That cheers me," I said, "because my son is three and listens to Elizabethan lyrics and doesn't understand the words."

"Three years old and responds to rhythm, you say?"

Roger Kahn, who was a friend of Robert Frost for many years, is a free-lance editor and writer, most frequently a sports writer. His pieces have appeared in The Saturday Evening Post, *the* Deseret News, The American Scholar, *among many others; he is the editor of* The World of John Lardner *(Simon & Schuster).*

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"Yes."

"Of course," Frost said, "because his heart beats and he's seen the waves."

So he was — and nothing else is as important — a lyric man who loved beauty and who moved with beauty and who spoke with beauty, wholly original, and unique.

I brought my son to see him a year later, on a day when Frost wanted to talk politics. I listened, disappointed. I wanted to talk writing. The child ran out into a cornfield and played. Then it was time to go and I gathered the child, hiked him onto my shoulder and started down the steep hill. Frost ran to the porch, calling, "The boy, the boy. I have to say goodby to the boy." I turned and then the boy stared at Frost, who was eighty-seven, stared at Frost, all wonder, and Frost looked at the boy with a face I read as love.

Down the hill, I heard Robert Frost cry after me, "Come back again, if you'd care to." Because trivialities crowded my time, I never did.

Israel in Fiction

ISRAELI STORIES. Edited by Joel Blocker. Schocken Books. 256 pp. $3.95.

Ronald Sanders

It is hard to imagine when before, in the history of the world, a culture came into being under as watchful eyes as has the State of Israel. Did any Roman academician ever go out to live for a time in some Gaulish equivalent of a kibbutz in order to do a book on its social structure? Israel must pay the price of having been born in an age of anthropology. Every stage in its development is watched by the world with fascination; every literary expression by an Israeli is scanned hopefully for whatever signs it may give of the appearance of a latter-day Shakespeare writing in the language of the Bible. If these are difficult conditions for a writer to work under, they become still more difficult when the writer himself shares some of the attitudes that created them. For the fact is that Israel is a profoundly self-conscious society. Self-consciousness has created it: a nation of Jewish farmers has been the product of a moral and intellectual effort, green hillsides and teeming cities the work of conscious planning. It is both fitting and natural that Israeli writers should manifest this quality in their work.

Of the eight writers represented in this most recent anthology of Israeli fiction, only three were born in Israel. For the others, the fact of being Israeli is an effort of the will, an effort which is, for the most part, reflected in their stories. Aharon Megged's "The Name" considers the problem in a classic form. An old grandfather, full of memories of Russia, wants his Israeli-born granddaughter and her husband to call their new-born son Mendele—a name which makes about the same impression on the ear of an Israeli as it does upon that of an American. The parents refuse, and feel sorrowfully the gulf that exists between themselves and the Jewish past, represented by the grandfather. The question raised here, and so often throughout the stories in this collection, is: to what extent is an Israeli still a Jew?

Haim Hazaz, born like Megged in Eastern Europe, suggests that an Israeli is no longer a Jew at all. "The Sermon" is a discourse on Jewish history delivered by Yudka to the fellow members of his kibbutz. "I want to state," he says, "that I am opposed to Jewish history. . . ." His opposition turns out not to be wholehearted; he admits that there is something heroic in the Jewish capacity to endure suffering. But this long history of "oppression, defamation, persecution, martyrdom," has been put to an end by the act that has made Yudka and his friends into farmers working on the soil of their own country. The nature of their lives is a rejection of Jewish history. For Yudka, however, the rejection is not made without some ill-concealed regret.

Even the Israeli-born S. Yizhar shows more regard for Jewish history than his fathers, the generation of Yudka, intended him to have. His story, "The Prisoner," deals with the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. For the first time in centuries, the Jews are fighting as a nation with an army. Not only are they no longer the oppressed people of history, they can now even be the oppressors. A simple Arab shepherd is captured for questioning by Israeli soldiers. The young soldier who is the protagonist of the story cannot help being dismayed by the spectacle of Jews playing the role of captors and interrogators. When he watches his officers beat the prisoner, his horror is, in a sense, that of any innocent person repelled by the abuses of power. The situation should, in principle, be no different if this were the story of, say, a French soldier reacting against the mistreatment of Algerians by his officers. But there is a special pain, and even confusion, in this soldier's reaction, because of his knowledge that his officers are Jews. The story ends in a lengthy and inconclusive monologue as the soldier argues with himself whether to release the Arab prisoner, who has been placed in his custody. The poor artistry of these last few pages may well stem from the author's own ambivalence about what he has described.

Yizhar has attempted, not quite successfully, to do as Yudka proposes: reject Jewish history. He has written a story that deals with Israelis as a people with a country, that is, as a people with its share of commissars and brutes as well as saints. In this sense, the greatest of present-day Israeli writers is not Israeli at all. The venerable S. Y. Agnon, in his story, "Forevermore," offers a theory of Jewish history that is precisely in accord with what Yudka has rejected. An obscure and difficult, but strangely beautiful work, "Forevermore" tells of the life's passion of one Adiel Amzeh, who has spent twenty years working on the history of the city of Gumlidata, "the pride of mighty nations until it was reduced to dust and ashes by the Gothic hordes, and its people enslaved." At the very moment when Amzeh is to see the publisher to discuss the apparently completed work, he receives word that a hitherto undiscovered source of information, a chronicle of Gumlidata kept by one of its citizens, is to be found in the library of the leper hospital outside town. Forgetting his appointment, he goes to the hospital, finds the book, which is covered with stains from the tears and suppurations of lepers who have read it through the ages, and reads through the sad tale of the city's destruction. "And since there

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were many things and learning is endless," the last sentence of the story reads, "and there is much to discover and investigate and understand, he did not put his work aside and did not leave the hospital and he remained there forevermore."

Although the story is far too good to deserve being taken as a point-for-point allegory, one nevertheless cannot escape the conclusion that this once great nation whose legacy is now being maintained among the lepers is very like the Jewish people. And the fact that Amzeh (whose name, incidentally, means "this people") thought for a moment that his work had come to an end, only to discover that it goes on forever, suggests the idea that Jewish history is endless, and is not dependent upon the rise and fall of states. Agnon, a man born in the diaspora, has settled in the country where the language in which he writes is the native tongue, but this act has not been for him, as it was for Yudka, a rejection of Jewish history.

If settling in Israel does not, then, necessarily mean a rejection of Jewish history, it is also a question whether settlement in Israel is the only way that Jews are rejecting their history in the world today. After all, the "Jewish history" to which Yudka refers is the tradition of the ghettos of Eastern Europe. This was brought to an end, not by the founding of a Jewish state, but gradually by emigration to various parts of the world, and suddenly by Hitler's troops. Jewish life in America and Western Europe today is as much a rejection of that Eastern European past as is life in Israel. Furthermore, it has been the role of Israel to reveal to itself and to the world that the old Jewish communities of Eastern Europe were not even the sole centers of Jewish history. Jews of African and Asian origin now constitute a majority of the population of the state. Yudka's opposition to Jewish history is to a large extent a rejection of Eastern Europe; Hazaz, in particular, has written works dealing with the lives of the Oriental Jews of Israel. In this sense, it is more likely Hazaz, rather than Agnon, who is speaking along the lines of an Israeli literature of the future. When the renaissance of a native Israeli literature does take place, it may not seem especially Jewish at all, or may, at any rate, demand of many of us that we revise our conception of what Jewish literature or history is. Even Adiel Amzeh found that what he thought he knew he did not really know after all.

A Hold on Life

TWENTY POEMS OF GEORG TRAKL. Translated from the German, by James Wright and Robert Bly. The Sixties Press. 62 pp. $2. $1 paper.

H. Arthur Klein

This small book from a small press deserves a welcome. It extends the opportunity for readers of English to experience a poet who merits all the recognition he is gaining. For Trakl (1887-1914) unfolded in his short, strangely symbolic life, a talent that possibly has more impact for our time than for his own.

Of the twenty poems presented bilingually here — original German on left, English translation on right — ten or twelve are not otherwise available in our language within book covers, so far as the reviewer knows. Seven of the twenty are included in one or both of two useful recent anthologies: *German Poetry from Hölderlin to Rilke,* edited by Angel Flores (Anchor) and *Penguin Book of German Verse,* edited by Leonard Foster. The latter offers "plain prose translations," the former poetic translations by various hands, not including Wright or Bly.

The present translations are readable and devoted, even when marred by minor misunderstandings and a few infelicities of phrasing. Trakl's two rhymed poems among the twenty are rendered without rhyme. His power and amazing precision of imagery do come through memorably. Readers of this book should include poets, for here is certainly a poet's

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H. Arthur Klein, translator, author and critic, has recently translated many poems of Christian Morgenstern, some of which have been accepted by The Nation. *His two volumes of rhymed translations of picture stories by Wilhelm Busch have recently been brought out by Dover; his illustrated study,* Graphic Worlds of Peter Bruegel the Elder, *will be published soon, also by Dover.*

Why didn't Khrushchev destroy this book?



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poet. He belongs with the best who have used the German language in the past century.

His qualities, as here revealed, are admirable individually, remarkable in conjunction: Great compression; extreme, often incredible, economy of expression; simplicity to the verge of starkness, stripped bare of rhetoric; concrete imagery, reaching all sensory channels, especially visual; restraint, revealing rather than concealing deep, indeed desperate, emotion; fearless confrontation of feeling and precision in its definition, yet always by implication, not by adjectival and abverbial mawkishness; precision, too, in depicting nature and human artifacts.

Trakl's tones are somber, dark, some would say "morbid." Yet his is vital, taut work, not tired, flabby, pathetic. All this is tied up into an almost unbearable tension, clean and tight, far from hysteria. Clearly he is a poet by no means "typically German." Rilke revered and praised him. The contemporary critic and translator, Michael Hamburg, devotes attention to him. Yet Trakl is not to be "appreciated" by means of reviewers or critics, including this one. Only patient reading and rereading unfold his richness. Not that he is obscure or pedantically allusive; rather that so much speaks out of what Wright and Bly paradoxically call his "silence" or "silences."

Trakl was killed by World War I. Not in it — by it. Born of a German-speaking family, partly Czech, he received a pharmacy degree in Vienna. (Comparisons with Keats do not apply.) His poems, of which few more than 100 survive, show his strong awareness of evil in the world and his personal apprehension before it. War brought him into the Army. As a medical corps man he served near Galicia. Slaughter and the sufferings of the wounded afflicted him unbearably. Following the battle of Grodek he was assigned to care for ninety seriously wounded. "That night," writes Bly, "he attempted to kill himself but was prevented by friends." Not for long, however. He struggled on, taking drugs. After a time he was committed as a patient to a hospital in Cracow. There he killed himself with a poisonous overdose. He died in November, 1914. The war had still four years to run. Still to come were Hitler, World War II, extermination camps and ovens, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and . . . ?

Trakl's most memorable and best-known poem is quite certainly his last, called simply *Grodek*. In seventeen lines, solid with sharp images, it climbs to a climax, remarkable in Trakl because so poignantly couched in human terms:

The hot flame of the spirit today is
fed by a more monstrous pain:
The unborn grandchildren.

It is well said of Trakl that "his creative work was his principal hold on life." Now memory of him rests on it alone. And with what tenacity and vitality it holds! These poems show he was not merely, or even mainly, "a Nietzsche epigone who had undergone the influence of Stefan Georg and Hofmannsthal," as Angel Flores declared. Georg and Hofmannsthal are now, like Katisha, "sufficiently decayed." They date. Trakl seems insulated against passage of time.

The charge of following after Nietzsche is another matter. Nietzsche as poet is magnificent. Yet these twenty poems are not derivative of him. Nietzsche as ethical thinker is pretentious, pathetic, fallacious. No "supermanship" is evident in this Trakl. What Trakl's poetry deplores or laments — implicitly, not explicitly — is what Nietzsche himself would have denounced, had he had both life and mind in 1914. What Trakl rejected, with life itself, a living Nietzsche would have rejected. To that unprovable extent, the analogy or influence holds. But not beyond.

Trakl's range is narrow. He digs deep, deeper, deepest. His control is incredible, but feeling is always present and intense. This small, searing body of work suggests what poetry today must grasp if it is to touch realities in this, our own time of a new World War, sometimes called "the cold."

The Visitant

Entering the living room, he said
As a clown — professional —
I accept of course all losses
Philosophically
And, like most men, seize my paper
Not to discover what has happened
But to make certain
Nothing has happened —
And you? — (we should introduce ourselves)
Professional or unprofessional
Sitters, breathers, readers
In living rooms?

Born and desperate in their room
The couple
Not believing he was really there
Philosophically
Continued reading.

I see you too are clowns, he said
And passed on through.

George Cuomo

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(Continued from page 117)

and add to the crowded conditions in the cities? How do we rationalize this with present unemployment rates at unacceptably high levels? Since subsidies from public funds are necessary in either case, isn't it better to subsidize people on farms rather than to uproot them and then have to subsidize them in the city?

These questions help to clarify the underlying problem. *The fact is that the farm problem is only a small part of a much larger difficulty.* The larger task is one of devising procedures of income distribution consistent with a productive system increasingly dominated by machine techniques.

In spite of the apparent illogic, there is no real alternative to urbanization. In the first place, the movement to the cities has been proceeding rapidly, not by any coercion, but through the voluntary choices of individuals. Problems associated with reversing these trends would be much more difficult of solution and would require even more drastic social and institutional change than those required for adjusting to present trends. But, more important, I believe that when we deal with the complex problem of institutional change, we cannot move very far beyond our present experience. The urban-industrial sector is the growing sector of our society. The problem of unemployment will likely increase and require some new arrangements even in the absence of pressures added by farmers moving to the cities. Institutional modifications must and will come at the point of greatest pressure—in the cities. Since the farm problem is only a small part of this larger problem, we cannot hope to solve it by holding people on the farm. Paradoxical though it may seem, a solution to the farm problem is dependent on institutional change in the city.

Institutional change is always peripheral and marginal. We proceed by small steps and never get far ahead of our traditional ways of doing things. Rather than moving from our present rural experience, it is certainly a smaller, more acceptable step to move from our present urban-industrial experience in meeting the problems posed by a society of abundance. Here we have unemployment compensation that can be extended, a minimum wage that can be increased, work time that can be shortened, adult educational facilities that can be expanded, etc. Farm people cannot live, or solve their problems, in isolation and apart from this main stream of American life. They must in some way become attached to those institutional arrangements whose modification and evolution hold promise for meeting the challenge of our age. This challenge is basically one of legitimatizing new means for sharing the national wealth, which is increasingly produced by machines rather than by human labor.

The implications of this view of our farm dilemma may be difficult to accept. We have been told that the farm problem can be solved, that surpluses can be controlled, that farm incomes can be improved, that government costs can be reduced, that the family farm can be preserved—and that consumers can still have an abundance of cheap food. All this, if only the "right" farm policy were adopted! But these are inconsistent and unrealistic objectives.

A deep-rooted custom in American life, growing out of our frontier experience, is to *solve* problems rather than learning to live with them. *But, like the cold war, the farm problem must be lived with.* There is no solution in the short run. Positive action is needed in the area of institutional modification which will permit evolution of a new system consistent with an age of abundance rather than with an age of scarcity.

THEATRE

Harold Clurman

In my book *The Fervent Years* I speak of the "high school academicism" of the Playwrights Company during the early years of that organization's activities in the thirties. I had in mind such a play, among others, as Robert Sherwood's *Abe Lincoln in Illinois.* After viewing its new production at the Phoenix Theatre, I find my epithet a little snide.

It is true that the play, which many pronounced "great," has about it the quality of a chromo, a sentimentally patriotic backward look that smacks of a commencement-day speech intended to fire students with ardor for the past so that they may rise to the challenge of the present. *Abe Lincoln in Illinois* was written in 1938 when the country was of an emphatically liberal disposition, aware of the Hitler menace and of the imminence of the war to stop him. The historical moment played an important role in the audience's response to the play.

Its simple-mindedness rendered me reluctant to acknowledge the play's merit in terms of the kind of enthusiasm it aroused, although even then I could not but be moved by the eloquence of many of its speeches, which are direct transcripts from Lincoln. Today, when the play, despite the struggle in the South over segregation, is much less "topical," I am touched by the very qualities I previously found juvenile. The play's naïveté is sweet and healthy.

There is here, apart from the Lincolnesque idealism and fond image

Watch a 16 year old girl set out to destroy a man...

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of our American past, a further and important element of personal pathos. Robert Sherwood was for some years oppressed by a (Splenglerian?) sense of doom as it was set to an American key in Joseph Wood Krutch's *The Modern Temper*. He wrote entertainments (*The Petrified Forest, Idiot's Delight*), but running through them was a note of depression never forceful enough to perturb the theatregoer. One remarked in Sherwood a morose withdrawal from the wasteland.

With the advent of Roosevelt, and possibly because of some changes in his domestic life, Sherwood was swept into action. He assisted Roosevelt with his speeches, he became an unofficial member of the administration. Democracy, anti-fascism and the fight against other forms of reaction were causes that now demanded his participation. Thus Sherwood felt a kinship with Lincoln in whom he saw a melancholy man bearing some permanent scar on his soul, a man without much ambition, forced by the pressure of history, conscience, common sense and a decent modicum of vanity into action at the crucial hour of his time. *Abe Lincoln in Illinois* is therefore the expression of a real experience written by a candid spirit that was not without stamina. The play was well worth reviving and it is well worth seeing.

The Phoenix production, under Stuart Vaughan, sprawls a bit and its cast makes so marked an impression of youthfulness that at times the sense of a spectacle for children is inescapable, though not at all unpleasant. Its most remarkable feature is Hal Holbrook's Lincoln. Holbrook cannot create the feeling of a deep-seated mournfulness which the play demands—a characteristic that Raymond Massey indicated in the original production—but Holbrook, besides an endearing charm, possesses a marvelous faculty of observation, an ability to represent tiny traits of behavior that cumulatively carry immense conviction. There is, too, a quality of *race* in Holbrook, something like an "aboriginal" or typical (early) Americanism, which contributes much to our pleasure in his Lincoln as it did in his impersonation of Mark Twain.

Holbrook's voice pipes a bit, but it ends by exercising an appeal of both innocence and humor. With all this, Holbrook is endowed with an impressive conscientiousness. Each detail in his stage presence is prepared and executed with great scrupulosity. This young man is an actor.

Sheridan's *The School for Scandal* (Majestic Theatre) is the finest comedy I have seen since 1777. Although the author was only twenty-six when he wrote the play, it is not only magnificently witty but endowed with a wisdom that transcends fashion and the cleverness of coteries. The play is as fresh today as it was on that happy occasion when it was first given at Drury Lane (or was it Convent Garden?). A lady of high literary eminence confessed the other night in the lobby of the Majestic that she felt a little self-conscious at the play because the kind of gossip and convivial malice it satirized was exactly the pastime in which she and most of her friends indulge.

The writing is a constant delight—one is tempted to say Mozartian. We enjoy it as a kind of music for the mind. It has sprightly movement, euphony, grace and edge. The play is superbly constructed, with an unsurpassed knowledge of the stage. The slight dust of age that now powders it sets off its magic all the more. Shining through its surface sheen is sovereign good humor and generosity of spirit.

I dwell on the play's text because it is too frequently our custom in the case of old plays to speak of their presentation and little of their matter. Let no one tell me he doesn't like *The School for Scandal* because of some demur over its present production. How often does New York see such a masterpiece? We have as yet no "Philharmonic" theatre.

It is objected by some people that John Gielgud's production is more stylish than sharp, more outstanding for costumes and settings than for concentration on the play's bite. Perhaps there is some justification for this complaint: the English producers and actors may have been more attracted by the play's manners, the quaint stylization needed for its performance, and the polish of their own professionalism than by the human thrust and acid of the play's situations. But I shall not cavil; I confess I was captivated and did not feel that the play had to be any more "real" than the English company makes it. Its removal or distance from me as an actual ("life") occurrence did not prevent me from relishing its artistic truth.

Ralph Richardson as Sir Peter Teazle is gigantically delicious. He is

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larger than life, a huge comedy doll of genius; playful, pitiful, foolish and adorable, out of this world and close to our hearts. I have seen the production three times (twice in London) and each time Richardson was slightly different, but always irresistible. The first time I saw him—early in the play's run—the moment of his discovering his wife behind the "villain" Joseph Surface's screen was most affecting. The genuineness of Richardson's emotion—its discretion as much as its poignancy—was unmistakable. That sort of truthfulness cannot be repeated at every performance, with or without a Method. But Richardson "dry" or Richardson "full," his Teazle is always a treasure.

John Gielgud, who seems almost too dear a person to play Surface, obscures himself in modest retirement much of the time, but rises to the bait of the screen scene with a great sense of fun. His voice is a bit too evenly and beautifully pitched in its velvet tone for character roles. In contrast, the peculiar reediness of Richardson's voice gives it an arresting oddity within its ingratiating resonance. But both men are a pleasure to hear.

Laurence Naismith's geniality in the role of the Surfaces' beaming uncle is infectious. Geraldine McEwan's Lady Teazle is both tart and tender, her pertness, suavely coupled with a sort of childishly pure uprightness, is very English and very winning. With a generally sound ensemble the production achieves a museum or exemplary stature.

ART

Hilton Kramer

The much discussed difficulty that American artists experience in pursuing their careers during their lifetime is often a mere prologue to the even worse fate their work suffers after their death. If an artist happened to catch the eye of Stieglitz (and then not ruffle his temper); if he happened to be in Paris or Munich at the right moment; if he was well-connected with artists or collectors whose aesthetic loyalties were later confirmed by a consensus of fashion (sometimes known as "history"); if he happened to have an important critic or museum director going for him at some time or other; if one or another of these conditions obtained in his lifetime, his work has at least a fighting chance of surviving in the public memory long enough to insure its proper placement in responsible collections and its admission to the art histories. It may be placed — both physically and historically — only to be forgotten, but at least the basis for some future recovery, should the work prove equal to it, will have been laid.

In most cases, however, the work simply passes into the limbo of the artist's "estate," and remains there, a legal entity disconnected from the world of art, until some interested party begins the arduous job of restoring it to the aesthetic consciousness of the public. Often, of course, no such party materializes, and the work stays buried, unknown to later generations and effectively sealed off from the continuity of art and history to which it may have something of lasting interest to contribute. And I refer not only to the host of minor figures who inevitably form the majority of artists in all periods — and among whom, it should not be forgotten, are men of real accomplishment — but also to artists of great stature who, for one reason or another (and perhaps to their credit), did not qualify for the special tests of success which in modern times often have very little to do with artistic value.

The exhibition of sculpture by the late Saul Baizerman, currently installed at the World House Galleries, presents selections from a body of work that is one of the most important ever produced by a sculptor in this country, but one that has followed this familiar course of neglect at the hands of critics and custodians of both American art and modern sculpture. A look at the present exhibition will confirm for anybody with an interest in sculpture Baizerman's right to be considered one of the most powerful artists at work here, or anywhere, in the quarter-century from the early thirties to 1957, the year of his death. It is to be hoped—though under present conditions, scarcely to be expected—that this new exposure will be a step toward the ultimate restoration of Baizerman's work in the front ranks of the art of his time.

Baizerman worked in a difficult and laborious medium — hammered copper — and addressed himself to heroic themes which he realized, often with breathtaking perfection, on an appropriately monumental scale. (Several works in the current show are eight and ten feet high.) And his own heroism was equal to the task he set himself. At a time when art was becoming more and more ironic, defensive and self-concerned, Baizerman sustained a high ideal, both of human experience and of art's capacity to embrace great themes. It was an ideal already rare in his own generation—he was born in 1889—and it has become more so in the interim, but he none the less fulfilled it magnificently. The celebrated recoil from high style and exalted subjects that has characterized so much of modern art left him, not untouched—for a brooding modern consciousness pervades every aspect of his work—but undeterred from his difficult goals. The result was an art that is at once robust and

asleep on the train

briefcase, tight garter
over the knees
peep of fat little thighs
roll and lean with the fall of the train
eyes
shut. mouth open. so young women
tire with the rest tired workers.
jerk with the speedup and slow.

go-ahead signals flash by
the Special Express
has only one stop

where they wake from their trance
to themselves.

Gary Snyder

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poetic, an art permeated with an unyielding masculine force and tempered at every turn with the delicacy of a fine sensibility.

Deriving from the ideals of Rodin and Bourdelle, and reflecting at times a sensitivity like that of Medardo Rosso, Baizerman's style stands in relation to these masters rather as the sculpture of the French artist, Hajdu —the only other contemporary figure who, to my knowledge, has worked with comparable ambition and success in hammered metal as his principal medium — stands in relation to Arp and Brancusi. The titles of several major pieces (*March of the Innocents, Aphrodite, Song of the Earth*, etc.), evoking as they do the grandeur of the great classical themes, suggest the universe of thought and feeling in which the work was conceived; but Baizerman's originality — the crux of his achievement, really — lay in his ability to embody these themes in a completely contemporary mode of expression. Which is to say, in a style that conferred on the physical medium and the method of execution an expressive importance equal to that of the subjects portrayed. By subjecting the heroic nude to the rigors of the hammered-metal medium, Baizerman succeeded in revitalizing one of the greatest of sculptural motifs and making it truly modern. His masterly technique in modeling (with a hammer!) an unbroken metal surface so that it forms a seamless continuum of image and matter, and his ability to inflect every contour of this metal skin with the pressure of his own sensibility in a way that seems at the same time to liberate the natural expressiveness of the material itself — these and other characteristics of his style more than satisfy the demands we have come to make on the relation of art to its medium. Where Rodin's academic progeny isolated the nude from the medium in which it was conceived and sentimentalized it beyond the reach of art, Baizerman committed the nude irrevocably to the physical quiddity of his sculptural method and thus preserved its artistic viability for our time. It was a courageous and unique achievement.

The exhibition at World House includes nineteen works from the years 1931-1957, most of them single figures of varying size but a few, like the great *March of the Innocents*, consisting of a congeries of figures orchestrated into heroic, friezelike reliefs of the most compelling beauty. (Baizerman called such works "sculptural symphonies.") There is also a selection of smaller works (four or five inches in height), in hammered bronze, from the series called "The City and the People," 1920-1953, which consist of sculptural vignettes drawn from the life of New York as it must have looked to Baizerman in his first years here as an immigrant. (He was born in Vitebsk, and came to New York in 1910 when he was twenty-one.)

These smaller sculptures have something of the quality of Daumier and Rosso in their combination of social observation and sculptural purity, though there is a heavier, Northern emotion in them — as there is, indeed, in the monumental works — which separates Baizerman's world from that of his Latin predecessors. The small works also dramatize, in a way that is perhaps easy to miss in the more heroic pieces, the relation of Baizerman's exalted themes to concrete experience. The grandeur of his great style was not won at the expense of falsifying life but, on the contrary, by elevating something essential and concrete in life to another plane of emotion and contemplation. We have not had so many artists in our time capable of achieving this feat, which is at once moral and aesthetic, that we can any longer afford to ignore one who did achieve it with remarkable consistency and force.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 997

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 The fashionable world goes to such as Oahu or Hawaii, or someplace else in the Pacific. (7, 7)
8 Such bows might prove dangerous. (12)
10 Investment, but not in radio broadcast. (10)
11 Be disposed to what is between the extremes, or just inferior? (4)
13 One might hold them to be vacated tenements. (6)
14 How a bad comedian becomes rather frantic? (8)
16 Pertaining to the whole country, or just one citizen? (8)
17 Was Minos put into such a trance? (6)
19 The temperature of cats? (4)
20 Tender in the late hours. (Implies frustration to be good at first!) (5, 5)
22 What seems to be a crazy comparison? It's the Armada, honest! (3, 2, 1, 6)
23 Having contrariety. (14)

DOWN:

1 What a leading actor, even without a broken leg, should rely on. (10, 4)
2 Company visiting 10 should imply harmonious combination. (12)
3 Put out by this? (It implies the end of the line.) (10)
4 Frothy cheer in front of an obvious eyesore. (6)
5 The faux-pas seems to be concluded, but only put on by some. (8)
6 Near-great composer? (4)
7 Bunthorne suggested the planting of germs of such terms. (14)
9 Is the make-up of the priest nice, or rather like a pigeon? (12)
12 What the effusive might be doing. (7, 3)
15 Alaska, I'd imagine, would be a peculiar place to look for a Hindu dramatist! (8)
18 Has the style of dress changed so radically? (6)
21 Is there a governmental charge on one for transportation? (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 996

ACROSS: 1 Kentucky Derby; 10 Rifle; 11 Reactions; 12 Otterburn; 13 Radii; 14 Miscalculate; 19 Night letters; 22 Issue; 24 Main floor; 25 Hooked rug; 26 Nails; 27 Encyclopedist. DOWN: 2 Effete; 3 Theurgist; 4 Carbuncle; 5 Yearn; 6 and 21 Enterprise; 7 Broadway; 8 Groom; 9 Assizes; 15 Letting up; 16 Unrefined; 17 Insight; 18 Eggspoon; 20 Dogies; 23 Every; 24 Moral.

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

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